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The Path to Weimar Serbia?  
Explaining the Resurgence of the Serbian Far Right 
After the Fall of Milosevic 
 
Djordje Stefanovic 
A number of European countries are experiencing a rise in the blue collar and ethnic 
majority vote for the ultra-nationalist far right. The situation seems particularly ominous 
in Serbia, where the far right is enjoying a resurgence of electoral support, coming close 
to capturing the presidency in 2004. This study analyses the results of five post-Milosevic 
elections and finds support for the argument that the majority’s economic vulnerability 
and a sense of ‘ethnic threat’ are the major contextual predictors of far right support. In 
light of the demonstrated ability of the Serbian far right to mobilise economically 
vulnerable sections of the population, implementation of neo-liberal economic reforms 
might unintentionally bring them to power. The maintenance and development of the 
welfare state might counteract the electoral appeal of authoritarian ultra-nationalists. 
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Introduction 
During the 1990s, the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] was the most successful far right party 
in post-communist Eastern Europe. It was the most radical partner in Milosevic’s 
governments in the 1992-1995 and 1998-2000 periods, pushing the Serbian state towards 
inter-ethnic confrontations in both Bosnia and Kosovo. However, in October 2000, the 
Serbian democratic opposition overwhelmed the Milosevic regime, Milosevic and a 
number of close collaborators were sent to the International Criminal Tribunal for The 
Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, and support for his party collapsed. One would expect 
the far right Radicals to also fade away. 
Instead, Serbian ultra-nationalists are enjoying a surprising resurgence in political 
support. In the December 2003 elections, the SRS emerged as the largest single party in 
the Serbian Parliament. Then, in the June 2004 Serbian presidential elections, the SRS 
candidate won 45 per cent of the popular vote, coming close to victory. More recently, in 
the September 2004 local elections, the SRS won control of Novi Sad, Serbia’s second 
largest city. Finally, in the January 2007 parliamentary elections, the Radicals gained 
even more votes than in 2003. Instead of collapsing, the Radicals are close to regaining 
power. If this trend continues, it will have profound implications on the process of 
democratic transition in Serbia, on inter-ethnic relations within Serbia, and on regional 
political stability in Southeastern Europe.  
 It is puzzling that so many Serbs vote for the ultra-nationalists, given the miseries 
ultra-nationalism brought them during the 1990s. While media hegemony and electoral 
fraud were indisputably among the reasons for the electoral successes of ultra-nationalists 
during the 1990s, with the fall of Milosevic, these two factors have been essentially 
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irrelevant. There have been few reports of irregularities in recent elections. In fact, the 
respected Belgrade Centre for Free and Democratic Elections [CeSID] declared the 
December 2003 elections to be the most properly implemented elections in Serbia’s 
history. Furthermore, after 2000, the Radicals (and Milosevic’s Socialists) lost control of 
the state media; nor were they able to afford much time on commercial stations. Indeed, 
during the December 2003 elections, the major television stations showed a slight bias 
towards the governing Democratic Party.1 Yet in spite of mass media messages (or the 
lack of them), the Radicals received twice as many votes as the Democrats. To 
understand the re-emergence of the Radicals after 2000, then, new explanations are 
needed. 
To deal with the SRS resurgence, I draw upon two well-established research 
traditions that have rarely been applied here: studies of the Western European far right 
and North American inter-racial relations. Specifically, I test the economic vulnerability 
hypothesis, based on Kitschelt and Wimmer’s analysis of ‘welfare chauvinism,’ and the 
ethnic threat hypothesis, based on Blalock and Olzak’s analysis of ethnic competition. 
These hypotheses argue that if local contextual factors increase a majority’s sense of 
economic vulnerability and ethnic threat, then the majority group members are more 
likely to respond positively to the far right message.  
Empirically, I use a multivariate analysis of municipal-level data on the post-2000 
election results. Previous research on ultra-nationalism in Serbia includes political 
economy, historical sociology, institutionalist analysis, and survey-based social 
psychological studies (Woodward 1995; Cohen 2001; Goati 2001; Antonic 2002; Pantic 
2002). However, multivariate statistical analyses have rarely been used, with the notable 
 4 
exception of several studies by Sekulic and associates (1994a, 1994b, 1999). Even so, 
Sekulic’s studies use attitudinal data, not election results.  
Arguably, by studying the successes of the Serbian ultra-nationalists, we may 
better understand the vulnerability of democratising polities to an upsurge of nationalism. 
On the basis of a comparative historical study of fascist takeovers, Juan Linz (1980) 
points to the apparent paradox that fascist movements can only grow in liberal 
democracies. Since fascist parties do not function as Leninist-type insurrections, but 
rather, as nationalist-populist movements, they require political liberty to mobilise 
support. In other words, fascists need democratic institutions to capture power and then 
suppress democracy (Payne 1995: 490). Similarly, Snyder argues that the recently 
democratised regimes are exceptionally conflict-prone, especially if the authoritarian elite 
facing strong democratic challengers try to de-mobilize the democratic constituency by 
pursuing nationalist mobilization for diversionary wars (Snyder 2000: 28-9, 198; 
Mansfield and Snyder 2005: 29). Inter-ethnic warfare can produce strong domestic 
nationalist and militarist institutions and ideologies, as well as lasting external rivalries. 
In the end, repeated failed democratisations, strong ultra-nationalist institutions, and 
recurring inter-ethnic warfare can become a vicious circle (Mansfield and Snyder 2005).  
In the Serbian case, the ability of ultra-nationalists to capture power and control 
the coercive apparatus of the state has led to the escalation of inter-ethnic conflicts into 
military confrontations and ethnic cleansing. In short, whenever Serbian Radicals enter 
government, Serbia is soon at war.2 The larger implication is that as democratic 
institutions spread into previously authoritarian multi-ethnic countries, the sustainability 
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of the transition depends on the ability of democrats to prevent ultra-nationalist 
takeovers.  
 
The European Far Right: Defenders of ‘White Christian’ Europe 
While existing theoretical and empirical works on the Western European far right are 
useful for similar research on Eastern Europe, researchers need to take into account 
certain important differences in regional conditions. For one thing, while Western 
European far right parties have focused on the ‘defence’ of their own ‘homogenous’ 
nations as well as ‘Fortress Europe’ from the arrival of the allegedly inassimilable 
immigrant ‘ethnic other,’ the Eastern European far right parties have pursued territorial 
disputes with neighbouring ‘European’ nations (Eatwell 2004: 9).3 In addition, the 
Eastern European far right has often focused on supposedly disloyal and secessionist 
national minorities. For example, the Serbian SRS has openly called for the repression of 
the ethnic Albanian minority (Cohen 2001: 227). Just as the increased presence of 
immigrant minorities has been a political resource in the far right mobilisation in Western 
Europe, so too territorially concentrated national minorities have been indispensable in 
the creation of far right propaganda in Eastern Europe. Unlike their Western European 
counterparts, however, the Balkan far right parties have put their ideas of ethnic purity 
into practice – forming paramilitary units and ‘cleansing’ territories of ethnic others 
during the post-Yugoslav wars.  
 Despite these differences, the far right parties in both parts of Europe have a 
considerable ideological affinity, mostly in terms of their shared animosity towards ‘non-
Europeans,’ primarily European Muslims and Americans. Muslims are often portrayed as 
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anti-Western, intolerant, inassimilable, and highly fertile, thereby threatening a 
demographic take-over of European countries. Unlike the supposedly ‘barbaric’ and 
‘backward’ Muslims, the US is portrayed as the promoter of ‘corrupted’ forms of 
modernity, such as the despised move towards globalisation or the ‘horrors’ of 
multiculturalism (Weinberg 2003). 
  
The Crisis of Serbian Society and the Rise of Serbian Radicals 
The rise of the Serbian Radical Party needs to be placed in the context of the protracted 
and traumatic process of the disintegration of multi-national Yugoslavia. During the 
escalation of the Kosovo conflict and the Milosevic rule (1981-2000), Serbia’s once 
promising economy and stable ethnic relations experienced a catastrophic deterioration.  
In the late 1980s, the Milosevic government unilaterally abolished the autonomy of 
Kosovo province and used police repression and state discrimination against ethnic 
Albanians (Cohen 2001; Poulton 2003:132-135). Then, during the 1990s, Serbian regular 
troops and paramilitaries participated in the wars and ethic cleansing campaigns (Mann 
2005).   
Wars and mutual ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo have brought 
waves of mostly Serbian refugees into Serbia. In January 2004, there were 514,513 
refugees out of a total population of 7,498,001 in Serbia and Montenegro (without 
Kosovo) (UNHRC 2004; SSB 2005). The UN economic sanctions, the Milosevic 
regime’s mismanagement of the economy, and NATO air raids in 1999 have devastated 
Serbia’s economy. In 1993, Serbia experienced hyperinflation, almost 60 per cent 
unemployment, GDP per capita of $1,250 US (in 1989 it was $3,300 US) (Cohen 1995: 
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353-4; Cohen 2001:162). In 2001, only about 39.7 per cent of the working-age population 
was registered as employed (SSB, 2005). 
Despite the deterioration of economic conditions, the Milosevic regime tried to 
maintain the Communist era welfare state. During most of the 1990s, the state prohibited 
firing of  workers, which provided job security, but combined with declining output, also 
led to a fall in productivity (Mijatovic 2005: 295, 325). The Serbian welfare state 
continued to provide a wide variety of universal social services, such as health care and 
child care, but the quality has declined over time, because of lack of new investment in 
the infrastructure and arrears in transfer payments.  
 In the cultural sphere, the failure of a more inclusive Yugoslavism coincided with 
the ‘return’ to a more ethnically-exclusive Serbian identity. The ultra-nationalistic 
discourse of leading Serbian intellectuals (Dragovic-Soso 2002), the hate propaganda in 
government-controlled mass media (Thompson 1999), and escalating ethnic conflicts led 
to a decline in census self-identification as Yugoslav,4 the ‘brightening’ of once-blurred 
boundaries with other ethnic groups (especially Croats and Bosniacs), and a dramatic 
increase in ethnic distance (Golubovic 1995).  
As some former ‘Yugoslavs’ were turning into ‘Serbs,’ the formation or ‘re-
discovery’ of the more exclusive national identity was often accompanied by an 
increasingly hostile perception of their former fellow Yugoslavs. Serbian ultra-
nationalists vehemently denied that the Serbs had a privileged position in Communist 
Yugoslavia,5 denied or downplayed the major responsibility of the Serbian political elite 
in the crisis of Yugoslav federalism, and used biased reinterpretations of the common 
history to justify intolerant treatment of other ex-Yugoslav ethnic groups (Dragovic-Soso 
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2002). The crimes of Croat fascists during WWII against Serbian and Jewish populations, 
and the Ottoman era persecutions of Orthodox Christians by Bosnian and Albanian 
Muslims were cited as examples of the immutably evil collective essence of these other 
nations, which, in turn, justified Serbian distrust, intolerance, or ‘revenge’ (Brubaker 
1998: 304; Skopljanac et al. 2000; Thompson 1999). Finally, the recognition and national 
formation of Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Bosniacs in the Communist period was 
represented as a ‘false consciousness’ of ‘artificial nations’ who should now ‘return’ to 
their Serbian essence (Milosavljevic 2002: 191-231). 
While sections of Serbian civil society and democratic opposition parties rejected 
this kind of Serbian national formation, Serbian Radicals distinguished themselves by 
their ultra-nationalism, even in this xenophobic atmosphere. The Radicals repeatedly 
criticised the Milosevic regime for betraying the cause of Serbian unification (Markotich 
1995a; Skrozza 2005), presenting themselves as firm, uncompromising, and totally 
committed ‘Serbian patriots’ (Markotich 1995b; Smajlovic 1997). The Radicals 
consistently supported the ‘liberation’ and unification of all ‘Serbian lands’ into a strong 
Greater Serbia (Vucic 1995: 25; Zemunske Novine 1997: 19).  
From 1991 to 1993, the SRS sent party paramilitaries to the front lines in Croatia 
and Bosnia. Reportedly, Seselj incited the mass murder of Croats in November 1991 
(ICTY 2003). Just before the outbreak of war in Bosnia, during an SRS rally close to the 
Serbian-Bosnian border, Seselj promised, ‘We are going to clean Bosnia of pagans 
[Bosnian Muslims] and show them a road which will take them to the East, where they 
belong’ (ICTY 2003). Within Serbia, the SRS was calling for confrontation with ‘disloyal 
minorities’ and insufficiently ‘patriotic’ Serbs. In 1991, the SRS activists were reportedly 
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involved in the expulsion of ethnic Croats from Hrtkovci, a mostly Croat village in 
northern Serbia. And the Radicals and Milosevic were in the coalition government during 
the 1999 Kosovo war, when Serbian forces cleansed at least 862,979 ethnic Albanians 
from Kosovo (HRW 2001: 134).  
 The electoral defeat and the downfall of the Milosevic regime in October 2000 
seemed to mark the end of the horrors of ethnic cleansing and a new beginning for 
Serbia. Milosevic and a number of his senior associates were sent to the International 
War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, and the Serbian criminal justice system began 
prosecuting a number of lower-level perpetrators of war crimes. The new democratic 
government achieved macro-economic stabilisation, signed an agreement on association 
with the EU, placed a number of ethnic minority politicians in key cabinet positions, 
negotiated power sharing between Albanians and Serbs in the Presevo valley, and started 
negotiations on the future status of Kosova.6  
 However, the dark legacy of the Milosevic era lives on, making Serbia’s road to a 
successful multi-ethnic democracy and EU membership extremely difficult. For example, 
Zoran Djindjic, Serbia’s charismatic democratic Prime Minister, was assassinated by 
ultra-nationalist state security troops in March 2003. The ultra-nationalist groups 
associated with the Army of Serbia and Montenegro continued to shelter major Serbian 
fugitives from The Hague’s War Crimes Tribunal (Whitmore 2005). Further, by 2005, 
economic transition was entering a critical phase, with the IMF demanding dramatic cuts 
in social spending, regardless of the effects on economically-vulnerable sections of the 
population (IMF 2006: 29). In 2006, Serbian democrats failed to persuade the majority of 
citizens of Montenegro to stay unified with Serbia, and influential Western governments 
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rejected their demand to keep Kosovo in Serbia. In January 2007, the Radicals achieved 
their best results in Parliamentary elections in the post-Milosevic period.   
 
Theoretical Explanations of Intolerance and Support for Ultra-Nationalists 
Ethnic Threat  
What predicts majority intolerance and support for ultra-nationalists? Blalock, Olzak, and 
Nagel have argued that the increased presence of minorities leads to a more intensive 
inter-group competition for scarce resources, such as jobs (Blalock 1967; Olzak and 
Nagel 1986). Stemming from this argument, the ‘realistic conflict’ theory implies that 
higher levels of minority presence will be positively related to majority intolerance and 
discrimination.  
In support of the realistic conflict argument, multi-level US studies have found 
that whites’ anti-Black attitudes are positively related to the per cent of Blacks in the 
region (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989, p. 828; Kalin 1996, p. 171; Oliver and Wong 2003, p. 
568). Bergesen and Herman (1998) also report that the rapid migration of an Asian-
American minority into predominately African-American neighbourhoods was associated 
with local backlash violence during the 1992 Los Angeles riots. In Western Europe, 
studies have found that the per cent of ethnic minorities in a region is one of the strongest 
contextual predictors of the percentage vote for far right parties (Betz 1994; Eatwell 
2000a, p. 178; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002).  In repeated surveys, French National Front 
sympathisers report that immigration policy is a primary cause of their decision to 
support the National Front (Golder 2003). David Ost even argues that a major reason for 
the failure of the Polish far right to make an electoral breakthrough is the lack of locally 
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available ethnic minorities. In his view, without a few credibly threatening ethnic others – 
‘politically indispensable demons’ – the ability of the far right to mobilise the ethnic 
majority can be severely constrained (Ost 1999).  
 While it is generally recognised that the sense of ethnic solidarity with Serbs 
outside Serbia was a major resource for the Milosevic regime (Goati 2001), the sense of 
ethnic threat experienced by Serbs in Serbia has not received much attention. A major 
exception is a study by Massey, Sekulic, and Hodson. Using 1989-1990 Yugoslav survey 
data, collected just before the outbreak of war in Croatia, these researchers found the 
highest levels of ethnic intolerance were expressed by an ‘enclaved majority,’ a group 
that is a majority at the level of the republic, but a local (municipal-level) minority. They 
argue that the ethnic majority might experience its local minority status as ‘victimization’ 
(Massey, Sekulic, and Hodson 1999). Following this argument, I expect that the Serbs of 
Serbia who live in municipalities in which they have reason to fear other ethnic 
minorities or neighbouring states are more likely to support the ultra-nationalists than are 
those in ‘safe’ or ‘undisputed’ Serbian core areas.  
Serbs represent a majority in Serbia as a whole,7 but they are a local minority in 
Raska/Sandzak (a large Bosniac/Muslim minority), Kosovo and Presevo (a large 
Albanian minority), and Backa (a large Hungarian minority). This, plus a further rapid 
reduction in the percentage of Serbs in a region, caused either by ethnic differences in 
fertility rates, or by ethnic differences in out-migration rates, can lead to Serbian 
insecurity. In fact, after their loss of control of Kosovo, many ethnic Serbs see any kind 
of territorial autonomy for minorities as a threat to Serbia’s territorial unity (Bakic 2004, 
p. 13).  In a 2001 Serbian survey, 81.8 per cent of respondents rejected ethno-territorial 
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autonomy for ethnic Albanians in the Presevo region, and only 3.6 per cent supported an 
introduction of ethno-territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Northern Serbia (CPIJM 
Data Set, Studies JMS-160 and JMS-162).8 Finally, the sense of ‘ethnic threat’ is likely to 
be heightened if members of the locally-present minority are engaged in secessionist 
conflict with the Serbian state, as was the case with some members of the Kosovo 
Albanian minority. Arguably, Serbs who feel threatened by the ethnic ‘other’ might be 
more inclined to support ultra-nationalist parties, who promise to defend the unity and 
territorial integrity of Serbia by confronting the perceived secessionist minorities and 
aggressive neighbouring states. In sum, the percentage of minorities in the municipality is 
likely to be positively associated with the percentage of majority voting for the SRS.  
Scholars examining American evidence have argued that the effect of minority 
percentage on the majority’s intolerance is likely non-linear. Blalock (1967) posits that 
the relationship between minority percentage and majority discrimination should be 
positive with decreasing slope. Blalock’s proposition has been supported by subsequent 
empirical research. Schuman et al., for example, found that white Americans are much 
more positive about school and residential integration involving a small number of 
African Americans, than they are about integration when African Americans are a 
majority or almost a majority (Schuman et al. 1985). Hostility seems to peak when 
Blacks represent 40-60 per cent of the local population (Kalin 1996, p. 172). Similarly, an 
analysis of French election results in 1984 and 1997 discovered that the departments with 
the largest concentration of people of North African descent consistently attract about 
twice the level of support for the National Front than those with the smallest 
concentrations (Minkenberg and Schain 2003). The researchers therefore argue that the 
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majority is more likely to accept a minority if its own demographic hegemony is not 
threatened (Blalock 1967; Schuman et al. 1985; Kalin 1996, p. 172.). In the case of 
Serbia, I expect that the relationship between the percentage of minorities and the 
percentage of the majority voting for the SRS will be positive with a decreasing slope.  
Finally, municipalities with high percentages of refugees might be more likely to 
support ultra-nationalists. Research on other inter-ethnic conflicts shows that refugees 
(often expelled from their homes by ‘ethnic enemies’) are likely to be radicalised by their 
traumatic experiences and, thus, are more likely to support ultra-nationalists. For 
example, refugees from ‘unredeemed’ lands were a major constituency of the extreme 
nationalist parties in inter-war Hungary, and of far right parties in the West German 
elections of 1953 and 1955 (Kolsto 1995, p. 298; Brubaker 1996, p.  178). Further, the 
associations of the pieds-noirs, the European settlers forced to flee to France after Algeria 
achieved independence, have provided strong support of the French National Front 
(Veugelers 2005).  
In the Serbian case, the vast majority of refugees are ethnic Serbs who have fled 
Croatia, Bosnia, or Kosovo. In 1995, about 650,000 refugees were registered in Serbia: of 
these, 78 per cent were ethnic Serbs, 10 per cent ethnic Yugoslavs, and 10 per cent 
Muslims (Raduski 2001, p. 118). In many cases, refugees joined extended family 
members in Serbia. Ninety-five per cent of the Serb refugees from Bosnia were 
accommodated outside state refugee camps (Raduski 2001). Arguably, the presence of 
newly-arrived victimised family members might have a radicalising effect on the native 
Serbian population. Thus, I expect to find a positive relationship between the percentage 
of refugees and the percentage of the majority population voting for the SRS.  
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Economic Vulnerability  
Kitschelt argues that individuals with resources that could be economically beneficial in a 
market economy will tend to support market transformation, while those who are more 
dependent on extensive welfare state policies will vote against pro-market parties. That 
is, potential winners (professionals, small business people, the well-educated, the urban, 
and the young) are more likely to vote for pro-market parties than are potential losers 
(pensioners, the poorly-educated, and unqualified workers) (Kitschelt 1995a). Kitschelt 
goes so far as to predict that in economically depressed, post-communist Europe, ‘welfare 
chauvinism’ (targeting social services to the ethnic majority) might be an even more 
successful strategy than in Western Europe (Kitschelt 1995b, p. 23).  
However, one might wonder whether the welfare chauvinism thesis can be 
credibly extended to Eastern Europe. Several post-communist states have experienced a 
prolonged and extremely severe economic recession, coupled with a breakdown of the 
state institutional capacities (Manning 2004, p. 219). It makes little sense to debate who 
should be entitled to receive state services, if the state in question is unable to provide 
any meaningful services in the first place. However, while the Serbian welfare state is 
certainly not as well developed as some Western and Northern European states, economic 
and social indicators show that it has continuously engaged in a major welfare effort.9  As 
the Serbian state provides valuable social services, the political debates about entitlement 
are meaningful.  
Welfare chauvinism in Serbia is the ideology of an economically-vulnerable 
majority population that tries to monopolize access to scarce resources by portraying 
some national minorities as ‘disloyal’ to the Serbian nation-state, and therefore 
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illegitimate competitors for these resources. Western European welfare chauvinists 
typically argue that ethnic others are ‘illegitimate competitors’ for the scarce resources 
such as jobs and public housing, which should be reserved for the ‘real’ members of the 
nation (Wimmer 1997a, p. 21; Wimmer 1997b, p. 655). Serbian welfare chauvinists 
agree. In a 1996 survey, respondents were asked whether they agree that ‘when there is 
great unemployment, Serbs and Montenegrins should have a priority in getting jobs.’  
Thirty-four per cent of all respondents agreed, compared to seventy-three per cent of 
those who were strong supporters of the SRS (CPIJM Data Set, Study JJM- 129). After 
their electoral victory in Zemun, a suburb of Belgrade, the Radical municipal government 
took public housing apartments away from ethnic Croat families.  
 In the Serbian case, empirical support for the Kitschelt economic vulnerability 
thesis from individual-level data is remarkably strong. Studies of the electoral base of the 
Radicals and Milosevic’s Socialists indicate that the most economically-vulnerable 
groups of ethnic Serbs have recognised these parties as the major champions of their 
economic interests (Goati 2001). Notably, the inability of the democratic opposition to 
formulate an economic transition program that clearly addresses the social security of the 
economically-vulnerable section of the Serbian population has enabled the Socialists and 
the Radicals to include these groups among their supporters.  
In the post-Milosevic period, the Radicals have tried, and largely succeeded, to 
capture traditional Socialist supporters by criticising privatisation and calling for 
economic security. At a pre-election rally in Belgrade in December 2002, the Radical 
leader received enthusiastic applause for stating that the new government ‘is selling out 
cheaply the property that generations have created with hard work.’ Not surprisingly, the 
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majority of supporters attending the rally appeared to be elderly manual workers.10 By 
August 2002, manual workers were more likely to support the Radicals than the 
Socialists, while educated middle-class voters remained the base of the Democratic Party 
(Slavujevic 2002). 
While the studies based on individual-level data have found support for the 
welfare chauvinism argument, in this study I will test its validity with contextual factors. 
That is, the underlying reasoning here is not that the unemployed are necessarily more 
likely to vote for the far right, but that in municipalities experiencing economic 
deprivation (such as high levels of unemployment), everyone – including the employed –
is more likely to be fearful of the economic situation and thus more likely to vote for the 
far right. This argument follows the Western European theoretical arguments on the link 
between the subjective sense of economic vulnerability and far right voting (Eatwell 
2000b, p. 418; Wimmer 2006, p. 66), as well as the repeated empirical finding that the 
unemployment rates and the far right vote are positively related at the local level, net of 
other variables in the models (Dulmer and Klein 2005, p. 250; Lubbers and Scheppers 
2002, p. 123). Thus, I expect municipalities with higher levels of unemployment to be 
more likely to vote for the SRS.  
 
Data and Measures 
The dependent variable – electoral support for the SRS – is based on the election results 
reported by the Centre for Free and Democratic Elections [CeSID]. Only majority voters 
are taken into account, because survey findings indicate that minorities are extremely 
unlikely to vote for Serbian Radicals. Fewer than 4 per cent of ethnic Albanians, 
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Muslims, or Hungarians have a positive opinion of the SRS leader, whereas a 
considerable percentage of ethnic Serbs, Montenegrins, and Yugoslavs (hereafter, the 
majority) express a positive opinion (see Appendix 1).11  Estimates of majority registered 
voters are based on the assumption that the per cent of the majority in a municipality 
(based on Census results) is the same as the per cent of registered voters who belong to 
the ethnic majority. The registered voter figures were collected from the CeSID data set. 
 Using municipality-level majority vote as the dependent variable enables a study 
based on a rich election data set, but it also poses unusual restrictions in terms of the 
meaningful interpretations of results. On the positive side, from December 2000 to June 
2004, Serbia had seven national-level parliamentary or presidential elections. All 
municipal-level results of these elections are in CeSID’s data set, thereby enabling a 
time-sensitive analysis of a large body of data. On the negative side, correlations among 
contextual-level variables cannot be used to make assertions about individual-level 
relations. Thus, to avoid the ecological fallacy, analysis has to focus on macro-level 
explanations (Snijders and Bosker 1999).12 
 Ethnic threat is measured by the municipal per cent minority, derived from 2002 
Census data, and the municipal presence of refugees.13 While a number of refugees 
escaped from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s, two main waves of 
refugees arrived in Serbia in 1995 and 1999. According to CeSID data, early in 1995, 
there were 448,477 registered refugees in Serbia; they were joined by another 239,841 
Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia after the Croatian army’s 1995 offensive. According to 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data, the 1999 wave 
consisted of 187,129 persons, predominantly Kosova Serbs (also 19,551 Kosova Roma) 
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who were escaping from revenge attacks by Albanian extremists during and after the 
NATO troops’ arrival in Kosovo (UNHCR, p. 25).  
 Economic vulnerability is measured by several indicators. The unemployment 
variable captures the per cent of the working-age population registered as unemployed, as 
reported by the Monthly Bulletin of the Serbian Labour Market Bureau.14  This study 
uses data on municipal-level unemployment collected one to two months before the 
elections in question. Details on other indicators of economic vulnerability, namely, the 
availability of physicians, average wages, phone subscriptions, and municipal revenue, 
are provided in Appendix 2. The ‘physicians’ variable refers to number of inhabitants [in 
hundreds] per physician in the municipality. High levels of the variable imply low 
availability of physicians and greater economic vulnerability. ‘Wage’ refers to 
municipality-specific annual average monthly (after-tax) wages per employee, and 
captures dimensions of economic vulnerability distinctly different from the per cent 
unemployed. Since indicators were not available for all years, the exact mix of indicators 
in the model varies from election to election. Limited data availability is an impediment 
to the comparison of the models for different years. In line with the economic 
vulnerability argument, however, the expectation is that less-developed municipalities 
will be more likely to vote strongly for the SRS. The data analysis was conducted in 







The first elections after the fall of the Milosevic regime were held in December 2000. At 
this point, Milosevic was out of power but still in the country, his party was still united, 
and there was continued low-intensity violence between ethnic Albanian militants and 
Serbian security forces in the three municipalities with a large ethnic Albanian population 
that border Kosovo. Popular approval of the democratic parties was very high, however, 
and the Radicals received only 8.59 per cent of all votes.  
As expected, Model I in Table 1 shows that ethnic threat explains much of the 
support for the Radicals. The presence of minorities was a strong predictor of the 
majority vote for the Radicals. Similarly, the presence of refugees from 1995 (refugees 
from Croatia and Bosnia) was positively associated with SRS electoral performance. 
Unexpectedly, the presence of refugees from 1999 (refugees from Kosovo) was not 
associated with the level of support for the SRS.  
 




As Models II and III show, the effect of economic vulnerability is more complex 
than anticipated. The effect of unemployment was straightforward: as expected, per cent 
unemployed had a strong positive association with the SRS vote. The number of 
physicians per 100 inhabitants was statistically insignificant, and it had an unexpected 
sign. Model IV shows that there is a significant quadratic term in the relationship 
between the per cent minority and the SRS vote. This finding supports Blalock’s 
expectation that the relationship between the presence of minorities and the majority’s 
intolerance will be positive with decreasing slope. Overall, the models for the 2000 
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elections explain between 65 per cent and 69 per cent of the variation among 
municipalities.  
The September 2002 elections were held in a different political and economic 
context. By now, inter-ethnic violence in the Presevo region was replaced by carefully-
negotiated power-sharing arrangements, Milosevic and a number of senior members of 
his regime had been sent to the International War Crimes Tribunal, and Milosevic’s party 
had split into two factions. The reform of Serbia’s economy had brought macroeconomic 
stability and some major foreign investments, but also the first waves of bankruptcies and 
massive downsizing, especially in the banking sector.  
Table 2 shows that the results of the September 2002 Presidential elections reflect 
some of these changes. It seems that reduction in the objective ethnic threat (the end of 
ethnic violence in the South) reduced the significance of ethnic threat, while the increased 
pain of market reform, combined with the skilful SRS increase in anti-privatisation 
messages, helped the SRS capture more support from the now economically-vulnerable 
ethnic Serbs. As Model I shows, the ethnic threat indicators now explain only 45.3 per 
cent of the variability of the dependent variable, a drastic decline when compared to the 
Table 1 results. Furthermore, this time, neither of the refugee variables reaches statistical 
significance. While the 2000 models predict that a ten per cent increase in unemployment 
will produce only a 1.3 per cent increase in the SRS vote, the 2002 model predicts that 
the same increase of unemployment will result in a 3.8 per cent increase, net of other 
variables in the model. As the economic vulnerability hypothesis would predict, greater 
scarcity of physicians is associated with higher levels of support for the SRS. 
Surprisingly, average wages, phones per capita, and municipal revenue per capita do not 
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have a statistically significant effect. Model III provides further support for Blalock’s 
hypothesis.       
 
[Table 2 about here.]   
 
The November 2003 Presidential elections were held in a generally similar 
political and economic context, and the results are similar to those for the 2002 
elections.15 Per cent minority and per cent unemployed are again statistically significant 
predictors, and the quadratic term supports Blalock’s hypothesis. There are, however, 
several new findings. The economic vulnerability variables have a suppressor effect on 
the 1995 refugee variable. An increase in the municipality’s average wage of 10,000 
Dinars (about 150 Euros in November 2003) reduced the predicted majority vote for the 
SRS by 8.4 per cent. These findings support Kitschelt’s argument.   
 
[Table 3 about here]  
 
The Presidential elections held on June 13, 2004, reflect a changed political 
environment: anti-Serbian riots in Kosovo and anti-Muslim riots in Serbia in March 2004 
(HRW 2004) had shifted the political discourse. The defence of the remaining Kosovo 
Serbs, the return of those who had been ‘ethnically cleansed,’ the protection of Serbian 
religious monuments, and the future status of Kosova, were all back at the centre of 
Serbia’s political discourse.  
Table 3 shows the decline in the significance of economic vulnerability and the 
increased significance of ethnic threat predictors of SRS support. As Model I shows, for 
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the first time, the percentage of 1999 (Kosovo) refugees has a statistically significant 
impact. Contrary to Blalock’s argument, Model III shows that the quadratic effect of 
percentage minority is no longer significant.  
 
[Table 4 about here]   
                
 Since none of the Presidential candidates captured an absolute majority, the two 
top candidates went into a second round of voting on June 27, 2005. As the opponent of 
the Radicals was from the moderate left Democratic Party, one would assume that the 
Radical candidate might capture some of the moderate right vote. Indeed, the SRS 
improved its overall vote by 15 per cent. As Model I shows, while the overall model fit 
for ethnic threat variables remains the same, the importance of different predictors shifts 
dramatically. While per cent minority is still highly significant, refugee variables no 
longer have any effect. Model II shows that economic vulnerability variables suppress the 
1995 refugee variable. As in the first round, the quadratic effect in Model III is no longer 
statistically significant.  
 
Discussion 
This study finds that certain theories used to explain Western European far right and 
North American inter-racial relations are of considerable use in explaining the rise of the 
far right in Serbia. Both ethnic threat and economic vulnerability hypotheses are 
supported, albeit with some qualifications.  
While Blalock’s expectation with respect to threshold effects is mostly supported, 
the effect of the presence of the refugees is not as consistent as expected. Surprisingly, in 
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most of the elections, municipalities with a concentration of earlier refugees from Bosnia 
and Croatia appear more likely to vote for the SRS than municipalities with a strong 
presence of more recent refugees from Kosova. More targeted research on the electoral 
preference and contextual effects of the various groups of refugees might help to explain 
this.  
 While the findings for four out of the six elections analysed support Blalock’s 
expectation that the relationship between the percentage of a minority group and the level 
of majority intolerance should have a threshold effect, one wonders why the thresholds 
are roughly 15 and 40 per cent. The first threshold is very similar to the 10-15 per cent 
non-white threshold for white economic discrimination, identified by Blalock (1957, p. 
678) for US metropolitan areas in the 1950s. Blalock explains the first threshold as the 
effect of a minority’s visibility – the point at which the prejudiced members of the 
majority initially ‘realize’ there might be ‘a problem.’ One explanation for the second 
threshold is that the majority’s anxiety about the possibility of minority ethnic secession 
peaks as a minority approaches the 50 per cent mark locally. If the minority becomes the 
local majority in a municipality that lies on an inter-state border, a possible demand for 
the ‘correction’ of inter-state borders (the incorporation of the municipality into the 
potentially hostile neighbouring state) would become an easily imaginable threat to local 
Serbs.  
 Kitschelt’s and Wimmer’s hypothesis of ‘welfare chauvinism’ is supported by the 
findings on the success of the SRS after 2000 in municipalities with high unemployment 
and/or low average employment incomes. My findings and the results of previous studies 
(Slavujevic 2002) suggest that the SRS has expanded into the political space left by the 
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collapse of Milosevic’s party and the re-alignment of its working-class base. In line with 
Kitschelt’s expectations for post-communist Europe, the promise of social security for the 
majority seems to be a winning formula, even in relatively ethnically-homogenous, but 
economically-vulnerable municipalities. The prevalence of welfare chauvinism in Eastern 
Europe is further supported by earlier studies of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the 
Czech Republic.16 
The phenomenon of working-class support for the far right is not limited to post-
communist Eastern Europe. However, Serbian welfare chauvinism differs from the 
Western European variety. While the targets of exclusionary policies in Western Europe 
are typically recent (especially non-White and non-Christian) immigrants, in Serbia the 
primary targets are ethnic groups who have lived in Serbia and in the Balkans for 
centuries. Whereas Western European welfare chauvinists attempt to legitimise exclusion 
by arguing that only the ‘long established’ population is entitled to social services since 
they created these services themselves through heavy taxes (Wimmer 2004, p. 12), 
Serbian welfare chauvinists argue that presumably disloyal minorities do not deserve to 
benefit from the Serbian welfare state. 
The important implication for Serbia is that a neo-liberal economic transition, 
characterised by dramatic increases in unemployment and the further undermining of the 
social safety net, might create an opportunity for the electoral breakthrough of the 
Radicals. Indeed, in the fall of 2005, IMF negotiators insisted that the Serbian 
government accelerate structural reforms, in particular by keeping average wage 
increases below inflation, privatising all remaining socially-owned enterprises, initiating 
further bankruptcies, and implementing large and permanent cuts in health insurance 
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benefits (IMF 2006). According to the IMF negotiators, ‘the implementation of these 
reforms requires more political determination than seen so far. Agreed measures should 
be executed vigorously, despite resistance from vested interests’ (IMF 2006, p. 29).  
Apparently, the IMF has little interest in the predictable political consequences of 
such harsh restructuring policies. Unfortunately, this is a recurring problem. Susan 
Woodward has persuasively argued that earlier IMF-induced economic reforms led, 
albeit unintentionally, to economic decline and the disintegration of the Yugoslav social 
security systems, which paved the way for the ultra-nationalist movements of the late 
1980s and early 1990s (Woodward 1996).   
There is no need to repeat these mistakes, as there are better options for reform. 
Swank and Betz (2003) have found that Western European countries with strong welfare 
states absorb high levels of trade openness, capital mobility, and immigration rates 
without experiencing a major rise in the vote for the far right. They hold that a strong 
welfare state reduces economic risks and insecurities for the ethnic majority, thus 
decreasing the likelihood of support for the far right. Similarly, Snyder and Mansfield 
(2005, p. 276) conclude their comparative analysis of the causes of warlike behaviour 
among new democracies by arguing that the democratising regimes need to develop 
social welfare policies to buffer the costs of transition. Just as the development of the 
welfare state in some Western European countries arguably helped to undermine popular 
support for Leninist parties, so too the maintenance and development of the welfare state 
in Eastern European countries might play a decisive role in the reduction of the electoral 
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1 The Medium Group agency’s monitoring of Serbian mass media from December 8 to December 24, 2003, 
shows that the (highest ranking) Democratic Party was the subject of television reporting for 7,151 seconds, 
while the Radical Party received only 4,070 seconds (Media Monitoring  (Novi Sad, Serbia: Medium 
Group, 2003), p. 4).  
2 The Radicals supported a Socialist minority government from 1992 to 1993. In this period, Serbia 
participated in wars in Croatia and Bosnia. From 1998 to 2000, the Radicals and Socialists formed a 
coalition government. This time, Serbia was at war with Kosovo Albanians and NATO.  
3 There are exceptions to these tendencies. The Vlaams Blok in Belgium and the Northern League in Italy 
have focused on territorial disputes with the central governments, while German Republicans disputed 
recognition of the border with Poland (Betz 1994, p. 133; Gibson et al. 2002, p. 839). Yet the intolerance 
towards Roma minorities by Czech Republicans, the anti-Semitism of the Party of Greater Romania and 
Russian far right militants, or the hostility of Zhirinovsky’s LDPR towards immigrants from the Caucuses 
are similar to the anti-immigrant hostilities of the Western European far right (Brym 1994; Pehe 1996; 
Shafir 1999, p. 214).   
4 In the 1981 Yugoslav Census, 5.76 percent of Yugoslav citizens self-declared as ‘Yugoslavs in the ethnic 
sense.’ In the 1991 Census, this declined to 2.98 percent (author’s computations from Census tables) 
(Yugoslav Federal Statistics Bureau 1998). 
5 While it is debatable whether the Serbs were privileged vis-à-vis the Slovenes or the Croats, the ethnic 
composition of the key party and state agencies leaves little room for doubt that traditionally Christian 
ethnicities (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Montenegrins) were in a privileged position vis-à-vis Muslim 
ethnicities (Bosniacs or Albanians) (Szayna 2000).  
6 I use interchangeably the Albanian (Kosova) and Serbian (Kosovo) names for Serbia’s southern province 
whose future status remains bitterly disputed. 
7 In the 1991 Census, the total population of Serbia was 9,778,991: Ethnic Serbs about 65 percent, 
Albanians 17 percent, Hungarians 4 percent, Yugoslavs 3 percent, and Bosniacs/Muslims 3 percent 
(Yugoslav Federal Statistics Bureau 1998).  
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8 The CPIJM Data Set has been collected by the Centre for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research, 
Belgrade Institute for Social Sciences.  
9 In 2004, Serbian public expenditures were 42.3 percent of the GDP, within the average 40-45 percent of 
advanced reformers of Central Europe and the Baltic, and comparable to advanced EU countries (Begovic 
2005, p. 448; Manning 2004, p. 220; World Bank 2002, p. 81). This is a serious welfare effort, significantly 
above the levels of countries experiencing state disintegration. Since the Serbian GDP per capita (in 2004, 
US$ 5,200 in purchasing power parity) is much lower than in the EU countries, the amount of spending per 
citizen that the state can afford is also lower (Popovic 2005, p. 36). Serbia experienced short but traumatic 
periods of state failure to provide basic services during the 1993 hyperinflation and the 1998 war against 
NATO.  
10 Field Observations, December 2002.  
11 I was unable to locate survey findings on the party preferences of ethnic Bulgarians in Serbia. Two 
mostly Bulgarian municipalities are outliers in terms of the values of the dependent variable. While it 
seems unlikely that ethnic Bulgarians would massively vote for the Serbian Radicals, this possibility cannot 
be dismissed. Opinion polls report that during the 1999 NATO air attacks on Serbia, about 50 percent of 
Bulgarians expressed support for fellow Orthodox and Slavic Serbs, and only up to 24 percent supported 
NATO (RFE, Newsline, March 30, 1999). 
12 While it would be advantageous to incorporate individual level data and to conduct multilevel analysis of 
the SRS election results, inclusion of individual-level data would prevent the analysis of the impact of 
important municipal level predictors. The samples used in Serbian national level surveys are typically 
representative of the level of major regions of Serbia, not of all 160 municipalities without Kosovo. Thus, 
multilevel analysis of contextual effects would stay at the level of regions, and municipal-level effects 
would be lost. Moreover, Serbian survey samples routinely underestimate the SRS vote. This 
methodological problem is usually explained as a result of the social desirability effect: SRS voters are less 
likely to reveal their electoral preferences because of negative discourse about Radicals.  
13 While using the per cent minority as an indicator of ethnic threat is standard procedure, several 
researchers have expressed concerns about this approach. Since the realistic conflict theory assumes that 
what matters is what is perceived, using attitudinal measures of perceived threat is methodologically 
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superior to the simple equation of threat to group size (Oliver and Wong 2003). While one has to concur 
with these arguments, the appropriate municipal-level attitudinal data are not available in this case. Still, 
the findings of previous studies lend credibility to the argument that many Radical party supporters have a 
high level of ethnic distance from minorities. Further, in an already-cited 2001 Serbian survey, 81.8 per 
cent of respondents rejected ethno-territorial autonomy for ethnic Albanians in Presevo, and only 3.6 per 
cent supported an introduction of ethno-territorial autonomy for Hungarians in Northern Serbia. Thus, it 
seems plausible to assume that the perception of ethnic threat will increase with the increased local 
presence of ethnic minorities.   
14 It would be methodologically preferable to use municipal-level survey results on individual’s fear of 
unemployment rather than contextual data on per cent unemployed. However, such data are rarely available 
at a local level, as national samples representative at a municipal level would be prohibitively expensive. 
Several recent studies of the Western European far right use the percent unemployed as a measure of local 
level feelings of economic vulnerability (for example, Dulmer and Klein 2005; Lubbers and Scheppers 
2002), reasoning that the increased local presence of the unemployed will make others – including the 
employed – more fearful about their economic prospects, thus raising the general sense of economic 
vulnerability.    
15 The table showing November 2003 election results (available from the author upon request) basically 
repeats the findings shown in the Table 2.  
16 According to a 1998 survey, 39 per cent of East Germans (and only 23 per cent of West Germans) agree 
that ‘foreigners’ access to welfare services should be restricted (Minkenberg 2002). A comparative study of 
electoral politics in Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic finds that anti-market parties did best in regions 
with high unemployment, low educational attainment, and poor living conditions (Tworzecki 2003).  
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Table 1. Regression of the Percentage Majority Vote for the SRS on Predictors, December 2000 
Elections 
  I   II   III   
Predictors  
 
B t  Sig. B t  Sig. B t  Sig. 
Ethnic Threat          
   Minorities  0.140 15.010 ***  0.134 14.473 ***  0.221  7.409 *** 
   Refugees 1995  0.053   3.092 **  0.050   2.793 **  0.039  2.216 * 
   Refugees 2000 -0.033  -0.769 NS -0.020  -0.460 NS  0.024  0.550 NS 
          
Economic Vulnerability          
   Unemployed     0.129   3.448 **  0.122  3.320 ** 
   Physicians     0.021   0.467 NS  0.039  0.858 NS 
   Wages    -0.111 -0.363 NS -0.155 -0.519 NS 
          
Non-Linear Effects          
   Minorities Quadratic       -0.001 -3.045 ** 
          
Constant 4.260 14.758 *** 2.294 2.077 * 1.782 NS  
Adjusted R2  0.651   0.673   0.690   
N of municipalities 159   157   157   





























Table 2. Regression of the Percentage Majority Vote for the SRS on Predictors, September 2002 
Elections 
  I   II   III   
Predictors  
 
B t  Sig. B t  Sig. B t  Sig. 
Ethnic Threat          
   Minorities  0.232 10.241 ***  0.174  8.616 ***  0.328 5.486 *** 
   Refugees 1995  0.059   1.407 NS  0.052  1.324 NS    
   Refugees 2000  0.042   0.402 NS  0.105  1.135 NS    
          
Economic Vulnerability          
   Unemployed     0.383   5.122 ***  0.387 5.271 *** 
   Physicians     0.366   3.143 **  0.404 3.845 *** 
   Wages    -0.312  -1.530 NS    
   Phones     -0.006  -0.926 NS    
   Municipal Revenue     0.000   1.099 NS    
          
Non-Linear Effects          
   Minorities Quadratic       -0.002 -2.515 * 
          
Constant 13.596 19.466 *** 6.295 2.336 * 3.316 1.950 † 
Adjusted R2  0.453   0.529   0.539   
N of municipalities 159   159   159   



























Table 3. Regression of the Percentage Majority Vote for the SRS on Predictors, 13 June 2004, 
Presidential Elections (Round One) 
  I   II   III   
Predictors  
 
B t  Sig. B t  Sig. B t  Sig. 
Ethnic Threat          
   Minorities   0.245  9.828 ***   0.219  8.906 ***   0.276  3.356 ** 
   Refugees 1995   0.078  1.697 †   0.132  2.726 **   0.125  2.517 * 
   Refugees 2000   0.297  2.562 *   0.279  2.514 *   0.309  2.605 * 
          
Economic Vulnerability          
   Unemployed      0.229   2.708 **  0.221   2.585 * 
   Wages     -0.414  -2.513 * -0.423  -2.559 * 
          
Non-Linear Effects          
   Minorities Quadratic       -0.001 -0.722 NS 
          
Constant 13.266 17.239 *** 13.583  5.002 *** 13.468 4.944 *** 
Adjusted R2    0.470     0.519     0.517   
N of municipalities 158   158   158   






























Table 4. Regression of the Percentage Majority Vote for the SRS on Predictors, 27 June 2004, 
Presidential Elections (Round Two) 
 
  I   II   III   
Predictors  
 
B t  Sig. B t  Sig. B t  Sig. 
Ethnic Threat          
   Minorities  0.335 11.725 ***  0.311 11.039 ***  0.424 4.525 *** 
   Refugees 1995  0.011   0.211 NS  0.101   1.819 †  0.086 1.526 NS 
   Refugees 2000 -0.052 - 0.390 NS -0.049 - 0.386 NS  0.010 0.076 NS 
          
Economic Vulnerability          
   Unemployed     0.108  1.112 NS   0.092   0.938 NS 
   Wages    -0.706 -3.741 *** -0.725 -3.838 *** 
          
Non-Linear Effects          
   Minorities Quadratic       -0.001 -1.265 NS 
          
Constant 23.604 26.746 *** 29.302 9.421 *** 29.073 9.350 *** 
Adjusted R2    0.496     0.543     0.545   
N of municipalities 158   158   158   

















Appendix 1. Ethnicity and Support for the Radicals 
 
Respondent’s Self-Declared Ethnicity 
Opinion on the 
SRS Leader 
Serbs Montenegrin Yugoslav Hungarian Muslim 
(Bosniac) 
Albanian 
Very Positive      9.4 4.11 3.95 0 0 0 
Positive 26.69 14.24 19.74 3.45 1.39 3.13 
Negative 22.47 20.89 15.79 19.54 8.33 21.88 
Very Negative       26.5 39.65 47.37 40.23 83.33      50 
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Source: CPIJM Database, Survey of Yugoslavian (Serbia & Montenegro) Public Opinion, Fall 
1996 
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Year of Data 
Collection 
Hypothesized 
Impact on the 
Majority Vote 
for the SRS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE   
Majority vote  
for the Radicals 
Percentage of the Registered 
Majority Voters in the given 
municipality who voted for the SRS 








INDEPENDENT VARIABLES   
Ethnic Threat    
Minorities Per cent of Minority Population in 
the municipality b 
 
2002 
Positive, with  
decreasing slope  
 
Refugees Refugees as a per cent of majority 






   
Unemployment Per cent of Working Age Population 








Physicians Number of Inhabitants [in 100s] per 





Wages Average monthly wage (after tax) 
per employee, annual average, in 









Phones N of phone subscribers per 100 
inhabitants, as a per cent of Serbian 







Local Municipal Revenue per 
Inhabitant, in Dinars e 
2001 Negative 
    
Note: Due to lack of 1991 and 2002 census data, Kosova results are excluded from the analysis.  
Sources: a Estimates calculated from the CESID Elections data set and 2002 Serbian Census 
results; b Linear extrapolation from the 1991 and 2002 Censuses; 1991 and 2002 Censuses ; c 
CESID Refugees Data and UNHCR Registration Papers; d Serbian Monthly Labor Market 






DJORDJE STEFANOVIC is a Doctoral Student at the Department of Sociology, 
University of Toronto.  
ADDRESS: Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, 725 Spadina, Toronto, ON, 
M5S 2J4, Canada. Email:<dstefano@chass.utoronto.ca> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
